Difference between revisions of "Denial of the is/ought gap"
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Revision as of 18:50, 23 January 2022
Denial of the is/ought gap is a key element to certain metaethical positions, namely moral objectivism and moral realism. These denials can take many forms. Some moral objectivists invoke a supernatural being to universalize their values, whilst moral realists collapse the boundary by attempting to show that at least some values are embedded in facts.
Moral Realist Denials
Sam Harris denies the is/ought gap by claiming that the facts of human suffering directly lead us to value well-being. There are values which arise naturally in the course of conscious existence, such as the value of not wanting to be burned after one has touched a hot stove and discovered firsthand the pain of burning. [1]
In this construal, the statement that “touching a hot stove is good” is an immoral proposition.
In The Moral Landscape, Harris writes:
“I am simply saying that, given that there are facts—real facts—to be known about how conscious creatures can experience the worst possible misery and the greatest possible well-being, it is objectively true to say that there are right and wrong answers to moral questions, whether or not we can always answer these questions in practice.” (2010, p. 30)[2]
Moral Objectivist Denials
| Statement of the claim | There is no is/ought problem |
| Level of certainty | Not Proven |
| Nature | Factual/ethical |
| Counterclaim | The is/ought gap |
| Dependent on |
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| Dependency of |
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